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    Scopus© Citations 1  1
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    A moral trade-off system produces intuitive judgments that are rational and coherent and strike a balance between conflicting moral values
    (2022) ; ;
    Daniel Sznycer
    ;
    Leda Cosmides
    How does the mind make moral judgments when the only way to satisfy one moral value is to neglect another? Moral dilemmas posed a recurrent adaptive problem for ancestral hominins, whose cooperative social life created multiple responsibilities to others. For many dilemmas, striking a balance between two conflicting values (a compromise judgment) would have promoted fitness better than neglecting one value to fully satisfy the other (an extreme judgment). We propose that natural selection favored the evolution of a cognitive system designed for making trade-offs between conflicting moral values. Its nonconscious computations respond to dilemmas by constructing “rightness functions”: temporary representations specific to the situation at hand. A rightness function represents, in compact form, an ordering of all the solutions that the mind can conceive of (whether feasible or not) in terms of moral rightness. An optimizing algorithm selects, among the feasible solutions, one with the highest level of rightness. The moral trade-off system hypothesis makes various novel predictions: People make compromise judgments, judgments respond to incentives, judgments respect the axioms of rational choice, and judgments respond coherently to morally relevant variables (such as willingness, fairness, and reciprocity). We successfully tested these predictions using a new trolley-like dilemma. This dilemma has two original features: It admits both extreme and compromise judgments, and it allows incentives—in this case, the human cost of saving lives—to be varied systematically. No other existing model predicts the experimental results, which contradict an influential dual-process model.
    Scopus© Citations 19  2
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    Jealousy as Predicted by Allocation and Reception of Resources in an Economic Game
    <jats:p> Evidence is abundant that evolution by selection has produced sex differences in the design of adaptations to solve the problems surrounding reproduction. A prime example is the design of human jealousy, which research suggests is triggered by distinct evoking acts that are specific challenges for women and men in their exclusive reproductive bond. It follows that jealousy would be directed toward driving away interlopers who could potentially threaten the bond with the romantic partner or increase mate retention efforts in response to sex-specific threats. To explore this possibility, we use as a methodological innovation an economic game for the evocation of jealousy. With a modified dictator game, we showed men and women in a committed relationship, conditions in which the partner or an intrasexual rival allocates money to (investing condition), or obtains money from (receiving condition), the partner or an opposite sex third party that they recently met. A sample of 56 heterosexual couples ( n = 112) participated in a laboratory setting. Our results show the different scenarios of this dictator game exerted the expected evocation of jealousy (controlling individual differences), with women being more jealous by the partner’s allocation of resources to a rival, and men reporting slightly more jealousy by their partner receiving money from a rival. We discuss the implications of this method to advance the comprehension of the adaptive function of sex differences in jealousy, the use of economic games, and possible modifications to improve the similarity of the game to a real assessment of actual male jealousy. </jats:p>
    Scopus© Citations 1
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    Ecological rationality of moral intuitions: Exploring its description with GARP and its functionality with a jealousy evoking economic game
    This introductory theoretical framework describes the existing literature on the approaches that moral psychology has followed in recent years. Specifically, the advantages and disadvantages of constructing this discipline will be exposed using theories and methodologies from other areas such as: neuroscience, evolutionary psychology and microeconomics, which have visions that allow us to understand how individuals respond to their environment and allow us to build models around how and why moral intuitions arise. We will focus on the evolutionary vision that allows us to understand morality as rules that solve certain ancestral problems that are believed to be relevant to our ancestors. In this context, intuitions have an important role in cooperation and consequently in the reproductive success of humans, for this reason we will change the paradigm that exists in the literature on reason vs. intuition. In which intuitions are thought of irrational behavior due to their close link to emotions. We demonstrate that intuitions are rational and explore their functionality from an evolutionary perspective evoking the moral emotion of jealousy