PANIAGUA PRIETO, PABLO IGNACIO
Preferred name
PANIAGUA PRIETO, PABLO IGNACIO
Main Affiliation
Email
ppaniagua@udd.cl
ORCID
0000-0002-1579-6203
18 results
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Item type:Publication, Conceptualising knowledge governance: knowledge regimes and institutions<jats:title>Abstract</jats:title> <jats:p>Social scientists are paying attention to the role that knowledge plays in economic phenomena. This focus on knowledge has led to exploring two challenges: first, its governance to reap positive externalities and solve social dilemmas, and second, how we can craft institutions to match the intangible nature of ideas with adequate property rules. This article contributes by elaborating on the different knowledge property regimes and the elements contributing to their classification. This paper first taxonomises knowledge governance regimes based on Ostrom’s work on institutional analysis. Second, it examines why governance structures for managing knowledge production vary across industries, according to (1) the characteristics of knowledge, (2) the attributes of the organisations, and (3) the different rules-in-use to enforce property rights. This is the first study at the intersection of institutional analysis and political economy that highlights the knowledge features, incentive structures, and mechanisms undergirding knowledge governance in different property regimes.</jats:p>1 - Some of the metrics are blocked by yourconsent settings
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Item type:Publication, Bespoke science: the use of ad hoc scientific advisory committees in the Covid-19 pandemic(Springer Science and Business Media LLC, 2025-06-19) ;Roger Koppl ;Kira Pronin ;Nick Cowen ;Marta Podemska-MikluchMany governments formed ad hoc scientific advisory committees in the Covid-19 pandemic because they offered the government greater control over policy advice than standing agencies. The difference between ad hoc and standing advisory bodies has been little noted in the literature. High-uncertainty crises demanding expertise and requiring action from the national government increase the value of policy discretion, raising the value of controlling the scientific narrative. An ad hoc body is generally easier to control than a standing body because policymakers have greater liberty to choose its members, specify its mandate, and disband and reconstitute it when needed. Control generally requires either a narrow membership or a narrow mandate. If members cannot be chosen to be reliably aligned with the government or its policy preferences, a narrow mandate will restrain the committee from offering undesired advice or analysis. Our argument builds on the public choice assumption of motivational symmetry: The choices of scientists and politicians are shaped by the same motives and desires that influence individuals in any other sphere of life. Our case studies of Italy, UK, US, Poland, Uganda, and Sweden support our theory.Scopus© Citations 2 3 - Some of the metrics are blocked by yourconsent settings
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Item type:Publication, Complex externalities: introduction to the special issue(2024); ;Veeshan RayamajheeIlia MurtazashviliScopus© Citations 1 1 - Some of the metrics are blocked by yourconsent settings
Item type:Publication, Complexity defying macroeconomics<jats:title>Abstract</jats:title> <jats:p>This article contributes to the literature on complexity and macroeconomic models by exploring the analytical relationship and tensions between complex phenomena and macroeconomics. By evaluating the properties of organised complexity, this article suggests alternative strategies for analysing the macroeconomy. Drawing on F. A. Hayek’s notion of organised complexity, I examine how its causal properties relate to the analytical criteria and assumptions that contemporary macroeconomic models use. The purpose is twofold: first, I associate the properties of complexity to the idea of the macroeconomy as an emergent totality arising from the causal interplay between individuals and the organising structure. This conceptually challenges modern macro and frames analytical tensions between complexity and macroeconomic analysis. Second, introducing complexity facilitates breaking away from current analytical and conceptual straitjackets in macroeconomics. Economic inquiry requires looking for alternative ways beyond standard models to analyse the macroeconomy as an emergent totality. This suggests stepping away from current formalistic methods and radical reductionism, in favour of unconventional strategies and approaches that are sensitive to rules, structures, and the causal properties of organised complexity.</jats:p>Scopus© Citations 11 4 - Some of the metrics are blocked by yourconsent settings
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Item type:Publication, On the nature and structure of externalities(2023); Veeshan Rayamajhee<jats:title>Abstract</jats:title><jats:p>This paper contributes to the literature on externalities and their classification by reconciling insights from transaction costs theory with James Buchanan’s and Elinor Ostrom’s analyses of property rights and institutional diversity. We critique the dominant Pigouvian analysis, which assumes only two forms of institutions—namely, governments and private markets—that can internalize externalities. We develop a new taxonomy of externalities that provides relevant conceptual space for a wide array of institutions that the market-versus-state dichotomy obscures. The proposed taxonomy considers two key classes of often-conflated attributes: (1) the scale of externalities, and (2) the assignability, enforceability, and tradability of property rights. This approach enriches the Coasean (transaction cost) perspective by allowing us to unbundle transaction costs in a manner that extends its applicability to nonmarket situations in which market-based transactions are either not permitted or technically infeasible. Thus, by integrating insights from two distinct Public Choice schools, we broaden the theory of externalities to not only encompass market exchanges but also to incorporate cases in which property rights are, and will remain, unclear. We conclude that institutional diversity can offer adaptable solutions to tackle medium- and large-scale externalities.</jats:p>Scopus© Citations 14 1