VERDUGO RAMÍREZ, SERGIO IGNACIO
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VERDUGO RAMÍREZ, SERGIO IGNACIO
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sverdugor@udd.cl
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37108846800

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Chile

2022 , SALEM GESELL, CATALINA ESTEFANIA , PEÑA TORRES, MARISOL , VERDUGO RAMÍREZ, SERGIO IGNACIO , DÍAZ DE VALDÉS JULIÁ, JOSÉ MANUEL

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Chile: The state of liberal democracy

2018 , VERDUGO RAMÍREZ, SERGIO IGNACIO , ENTEICHE ROSALES, NICOLÁS ALEJANDRO , ARÓSTICA MALDONADO, IVÁN

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2020 Global Review of Constitutional Law

2021 , ENTEICHE ROSALES, NICOLÁS ALEJANDRO , VERDUGO RAMÍREZ, SERGIO IGNACIO , Iván Aróstica

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The fall of the Constitution’s political insurance: How the Morales regime eliminated the insurance of the 2009 Bolivian Constitution

2019 , VERDUGO RAMÍREZ, SERGIO IGNACIO

Abstract Some scholars argue that constitutions may include an insurance that aims to protect the political rights of prospective electoral losers and prevents a dominant ruling coalition from undermining the competitiveness of the political system. Although some insurance scholars have recently paid more attention to the conditions that make an insurance more likely to be effective, the scholarship seeking to identify the limits of the insurance is still scarce. The literature on courts and democratization may help us to understand those limits by exploring successful and failed experiences. In this article, I argue that after constitution-makers agree to including an insurance, the incumbent regime may delay its implementation or, if the insurance is implemented, the regime may employ different political and legal strategies to eliminate it. I identify some of these strategies using examples from the Bolivian constitutional system. I argue that the Bolivian 2009 Constitution included an insurance and that the Evo Morales regime eliminated it with the help of the Constitutional Court. Although insurance theory expects constitutional courts to guarantee key institutional arrangements, the Bolivian experience shows that constitutional courts may in fact execute the opposite task, and that after constitution makers negotiate and approve an insurance, the challenge is to secure its implementation and survival.

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How Judges Can Challenge Dictators and Get Away with It: Advancing Democracy while Preserving Judicial Independence

2022 , VERDUGO RAMÍREZ, SERGIO IGNACIO

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Chile's New Constitutional Experiment

2020 , VERDUGO RAMÍREZ, SERGIO IGNACIO

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Los derechos sociales y la reforma constitucional en Chile: hacia una implementación híbrida, legislativa y judicial

2021 , Rosalind Dixon , VERDUGO RAMÍREZ, SERGIO IGNACIO

Este artículo sugiere que el proceso constituyente chileno no debe predeterminar las políticas sociales que las instituciones políticas han de implementar para responder a las demandas sociales existentes. En cambio, los autores argumentan que los constituyentes debieran tener por objetivo diseñar una constitución que guíe y facilite la aprobación de dichas políticas. La propuesta de los autores entrega una alternativa a la idea de adoptar un modelo de derechos sociales justiciables robusto al sugerir un modelo de derechos sociales ‘débil-fuerte’. Dicho modelo incluye la existencia de cláusulas obligatorias para que el legislador regule; un sistema de plazos específicos para aprobar la legislación respectiva; el reconocimiento de principios constitucionales que orienten las reformas políticas sociales, y el establecimiento de un mecanismo especí!co de revisión judicial.

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The Alchemists. Questioning our Faith in Courts as Democracy-Builders

2018 , VERDUGO RAMÍREZ, SERGIO IGNACIO

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How can constitutional review experiments fail? Lessons from the 1925 Chilean Constitution

2021 , VERDUGO RAMÍREZ, SERGIO IGNACIO

Constitutional designers establishing a new judicial review mechanism can fail to make that mechanism a relevant instrument for checking the power of incumbent legislators or presidents. Judges may refuse to exercise their newly established powers, politicians may refuse to obey their rulings, or the judiciary may be packed, among other possible reasons. The causes can be attributed to the existence of a dominant party system, the lack of political competition, problems of institutional design, or judicial culture. This article contributes to the understanding of this problem by exploring the failed constitutional mechanism that Chilean constitutional designers established in 1925. The 1925 Chilean Constitution established the power of judicial review of legislation for the first time in Chile’s history, but the Supreme Court generally avoided to be involved in political battles. Chile had a competitive political system with frequent and regular rotation in power. The literature claims that, under these conditions, we should expect judges to be more independent and empowered, but this is not what happened in the Chilean case. Scholars studying this period of Chilean constitutional history generally associate the passivity of the Supreme Court with a legalistic culture promoting an apolitical and formalistic judicial behavior. This article claims that the narrative of judicial apoliticism served to justify, and perhaps to persuade, the Supreme Court’s choice not to intervene in politics, but more attention needs to be given to the institutional weaknesses of the judiciary of that time and to the possible strategic judicial choice.

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The ALBA constitutional project and political representation

2019 , DÍAZ DE VALDÉS JULIÁ, JOSÉ MANUEL , VERDUGO RAMÍREZ, SERGIO

Abstract After the Cold War era, significant constitutional changes took place in Latin America. One distinct trend is the neo-Bolivarian constitutionalism, which has taken place in the ALBA countries, including the constitutional replacements of Venezuela (1999), Ecuador (2008), and Bolivia (2009). Many scholars have rightly criticized these constitutional experiments arguing that they have helped to deteriorate a liberal notion of democracy. This essay approaches a question that complements those criticisms from a different perspective: how the ALBA countries have resorted to varied notions of political representation. The authors use the classic work of Pitkin to identify the different sorts of political representation involved in the ALBA constitutional experiments, finding a combination of symbolic and descriptive representation. The former is linked to the figure of the president as a caudillo that centralizes political power, whereas the latter is fostered by both the president and the contents of the new constitutions related to the original peoples. As a result, the empowering purpose of constitutionalism has been preferred over its constraining purpose.

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