Research Output

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Publication

Ecological rationality of moral intuitions: Exploring its description with GARP and its functionality with a jealousy evoking economic game

2020 , BARBATO EPPLE, MARÍA TERESA

This introductory theoretical framework describes the existing literature on the approaches that moral psychology has followed in recent years. Specifically, the advantages and disadvantages of constructing this discipline will be exposed using theories and methodologies from other areas such as: neuroscience, evolutionary psychology and microeconomics, which have visions that allow us to understand how individuals respond to their environment and allow us to build models around how and why moral intuitions arise. We will focus on the evolutionary vision that allows us to understand morality as rules that solve certain ancestral problems that are believed to be relevant to our ancestors. In this context, intuitions have an important role in cooperation and consequently in the reproductive success of humans, for this reason we will change the paradigm that exists in the literature on reason vs. intuition. In which intuitions are thought of irrational behavior due to their close link to emotions. We demonstrate that intuitions are rational and explore their functionality from an evolutionary perspective evoking the moral emotion of jealousy

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Publication

Reply to Greene: No version of the dual process model can explain rational performance by people who made compromise moral judgments

2023 , Leda Cosmides , BARBATO EPPLE, MARÍA TERESA , Daniel Sznycer , Miguel Ángel Labarca , GUZMÁN PRICE, RICARDO

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Publication

A moral trade-off system produces intuitive judgments that are rational and coherent and strike a balance between conflicting moral values

2022 , GUZMÁN PRICE, RICARDO , BARBATO EPPLE, MARÍA TERESA , Daniel Sznycer , Leda Cosmides

How does the mind make moral judgments when the only way to satisfy one moral value is to neglect another? Moral dilemmas posed a recurrent adaptive problem for ancestral hominins, whose cooperative social life created multiple responsibilities to others. For many dilemmas, striking a balance between two conflicting values (a compromise judgment) would have promoted fitness better than neglecting one value to fully satisfy the other (an extreme judgment). We propose that natural selection favored the evolution of a cognitive system designed for making trade-offs between conflicting moral values. Its nonconscious computations respond to dilemmas by constructing “rightness functions”: temporary representations specific to the situation at hand. A rightness function represents, in compact form, an ordering of all the solutions that the mind can conceive of (whether feasible or not) in terms of moral rightness. An optimizing algorithm selects, among the feasible solutions, one with the highest level of rightness. The moral trade-off system hypothesis makes various novel predictions: People make compromise judgments, judgments respond to incentives, judgments respect the axioms of rational choice, and judgments respond coherently to morally relevant variables (such as willingness, fairness, and reciprocity). We successfully tested these predictions using a new trolley-like dilemma. This dilemma has two original features: It admits both extreme and compromise judgments, and it allows incentives—in this case, the human cost of saving lives—to be varied systematically. No other existing model predicts the experimental results, which contradict an influential dual-process model.

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Product

Dataset - A moral trade-off system produces intuitive judgments that are rational and coherent and strike a balance between conflicting moral values

2021 , GUZMÁN PRICE, RICARDO , BARBATO EPPLE, MARÍA TERESA

Data and scripts for moral tradeoff system paper in PNAS