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Item type:Publication, The algorithmic life seen from the Americas: An opportunity to deploy EU diplomacy with a social impact(2025)MATTHIAS ERLANDSEN LORCA7 - Some of the metrics are blocked by yourconsent settings
Item type:Publication, El proyecto constitucional chileno como expresión del populismo constitucional(2023)El rechazo de la propuesta de nueva Constitución, en el plebiscito del 4 de septiembre de 2022, marca un hito en el devenir constitucional chileno y debe ser analizado cuidadosamente como respuesta de la ciudadanía al proceso desarrollado por la Convención Constitucional. Este artículo postula que dicho proceso fue una expresión del populismo constitucional, luego de examinar los elementos que lo configuran.29Scopus© Citations 1 - Some of the metrics are blocked by yourconsent settings
Item type:Publication, How can constitutional review experiments fail? Lessons from the 1925 Chilean ConstitutionConstitutional designers establishing a new judicial review mechanism can fail to make that mechanism a relevant instrument for checking the power of incumbent legislators or presidents. Judges may refuse to exercise their newly established powers, politicians may refuse to obey their rulings, or the judiciary may be packed, among other possible reasons. The causes can be attributed to the existence of a dominant party system, the lack of political competition, problems of institutional design, or judicial culture. This article contributes to the understanding of this problem by exploring the failed constitutional mechanism that Chilean constitutional designers established in 1925. The 1925 Chilean Constitution established the power of judicial review of legislation for the first time in Chile’s history, but the Supreme Court generally avoided to be involved in political battles. Chile had a competitive political system with frequent and regular rotation in power. The literature claims that, under these conditions, we should expect judges to be more independent and empowered, but this is not what happened in the Chilean case. Scholars studying this period of Chilean constitutional history generally associate the passivity of the Supreme Court with a legalistic culture promoting an apolitical and formalistic judicial behavior. This article claims that the narrative of judicial apoliticism served to justify, and perhaps to persuade, the Supreme Court’s choice not to intervene in politics, but more attention needs to be given to the institutional weaknesses of the judiciary of that time and to the possible strategic judicial choice.13Scopus© Citations 5 - Some of the metrics are blocked by yourconsent settings
Item type:Publication, The social and health protection of migrants in Chile: qualitative analysis of civil society proposals for constitutional change(2023-12-01); Scopus© Citations 3 6 - Some of the metrics are blocked by yourconsent settings
Item type:Publication, 20Scopus© Citations 2 - Some of the metrics are blocked by yourconsent settings
Item type:Publication, Citizens at the forefront of the constitutional debate: Voluntary citizen participation determinants and emergent content in Chile(2022); ; ; In the past few decades, constitution-making processes have shifted from being undertakings performed by elites and closed off from the public to ones incorporating democratic mechanisms. Little is known, however, about the determinants of voluntary public participation and how they affect the outcomes of the deliberative process in terms of content and quality. Here, we study the process of constituent involvement in the rewriting of Chile’s constitution in 2016. A total of 106, 412 citizens in 8, 113 different local encounters voluntarily congregated in groups of ten or more to collectively determine what social rights should be considered for inclusion in the new constitution, deliberating and then articulating in the written word why should be included. We brought our data to statistical regression models at the municipality level, the results show that the main determinants associated with increasing citizen participation are educational level, engagement in politics, support for the government, and Internet access. In contrast, population density and the share of Evangelical Christians in the general population decrease citizen participation. Then, we further analyze the written arguments for each collectively-selected constitutional rights. The findings suggest that groups from socioeconomically developed municipalities (with higher educational levels and where the main economic activities are more distant from natural resources), on average, deliberate consistently more about themes, concepts, and ideas compared to groups from less developed municipalities. These results provide an empirical ground on the driver factors of voluntary citizen participation and on the benefits and disadvantages of deliberative democracy. Hence, results can inform the organization of new deliberative processes.Scopus© Citations 7 5 - Some of the metrics are blocked by yourconsent settings
Item type:Publication, The fall of the Constitution’s political insurance: How the Morales regime eliminated the insurance of the 2009 Bolivian Constitution<jats:title>Abstract</jats:title> <jats:p>Some scholars argue that constitutions may include an insurance that aims to protect the political rights of prospective electoral losers and prevents a dominant ruling coalition from undermining the competitiveness of the political system. Although some insurance scholars have recently paid more attention to the conditions that make an insurance more likely to be effective, the scholarship seeking to identify the limits of the insurance is still scarce. The literature on courts and democratization may help us to understand those limits by exploring successful and failed experiences. In this article, I argue that after constitution-makers agree to including an insurance, the incumbent regime may delay its implementation or, if the insurance is implemented, the regime may employ different political and legal strategies to eliminate it. I identify some of these strategies using examples from the Bolivian constitutional system. I argue that the Bolivian 2009 Constitution included an insurance and that the Evo Morales regime eliminated it with the help of the Constitutional Court. Although insurance theory expects constitutional courts to guarantee key institutional arrangements, the Bolivian experience shows that constitutional courts may in fact execute the opposite task, and that after constitution makers negotiate and approve an insurance, the challenge is to secure its implementation and survival.</jats:p>1Scopus© Citations 19 - Some of the metrics are blocked by yourconsent settings
Item type:Publication, Health in Chile’s Recent Constitutional Process: A Qualitative Thematic Analysis of Civil Proposals(2022); Scopus© Citations 2 2 - Some of the metrics are blocked by yourconsent settings
Item type:Publication, An experiential account of a large-scale interdisciplinary data analysis of public engagement(2022)21Scopus© Citations 6 - Some of the metrics are blocked by yourconsent settings
Item type:Publication, 26Scopus© Citations 4