VERDUGO RAMÍREZ, SERGIO IGNACIO
Preferred name
VERDUGO RAMÍREZ, SERGIO IGNACIO
Main Affiliation
Email
sverdugor@udd.cl
ORCID
0000-0002-9232-0786
Scopus Author ID
57217235600
33 results
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Item type:Publication, Los derechos sociales y la reforma constitucional en Chile: hacia una implementación híbrida, legislativa y judicial(2021) ;Rosalind Dixon<jats:p>Este artículo sugiere que el proceso constituyente chileno no debe predeterminar las políticas sociales que las instituciones políticas han de implementar para responder a las demandas sociales existentes. En cambio, los autores argumentan que los constituyentes debieran tener por objetivo diseñar una constitución que guíe y facilite la aprobación de dichas políticas. La propuesta de los autores entrega una alternativa a la idea de adoptar un modelo de derechos sociales justiciables robusto al sugerir un modelo de derechos sociales ‘débil-fuerte’. Dicho modelo incluye la existencia de cláusulas obligatorias para que el legislador regule; un sistema de plazos específicos para aprobar la legislación respectiva; el reconocimiento de principios constitucionales que orienten las reformas políticas sociales, y el establecimiento de un mecanismo especí!co de revisión judicial.</jats:p>2 - Some of the metrics are blocked by yourconsent settings
Item type:Publication, The fall of the Constitution’s political insurance: How the Morales regime eliminated the insurance of the 2009 Bolivian Constitution<jats:title>Abstract</jats:title> <jats:p>Some scholars argue that constitutions may include an insurance that aims to protect the political rights of prospective electoral losers and prevents a dominant ruling coalition from undermining the competitiveness of the political system. Although some insurance scholars have recently paid more attention to the conditions that make an insurance more likely to be effective, the scholarship seeking to identify the limits of the insurance is still scarce. The literature on courts and democratization may help us to understand those limits by exploring successful and failed experiences. In this article, I argue that after constitution-makers agree to including an insurance, the incumbent regime may delay its implementation or, if the insurance is implemented, the regime may employ different political and legal strategies to eliminate it. I identify some of these strategies using examples from the Bolivian constitutional system. I argue that the Bolivian 2009 Constitution included an insurance and that the Evo Morales regime eliminated it with the help of the Constitutional Court. Although insurance theory expects constitutional courts to guarantee key institutional arrangements, the Bolivian experience shows that constitutional courts may in fact execute the opposite task, and that after constitution makers negotiate and approve an insurance, the challenge is to secure its implementation and survival.</jats:p>Scopus© Citations 17 1 - Some of the metrics are blocked by yourconsent settings
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Item type:Publication, The ALBA constitutional project and political representation<jats:title>Abstract</jats:title> <jats:p>After the Cold War era, significant constitutional changes took place in Latin America. One distinct trend is the neo-Bolivarian constitutionalism, which has taken place in the ALBA countries, including the constitutional replacements of Venezuela (1999), Ecuador (2008), and Bolivia (2009). Many scholars have rightly criticized these constitutional experiments arguing that they have helped to deteriorate a liberal notion of democracy. This essay approaches a question that complements those criticisms from a different perspective: how the ALBA countries have resorted to varied notions of political representation. The authors use the classic work of Pitkin to identify the different sorts of political representation involved in the ALBA constitutional experiments, finding a combination of symbolic and descriptive representation. The former is linked to the figure of the president as a caudillo that centralizes political power, whereas the latter is fostered by both the president and the contents of the new constitutions related to the original peoples. As a result, the empowering purpose of constitutionalism has been preferred over its constraining purpose.</jats:p>Scopus© Citations 9 1 - Some of the metrics are blocked by yourconsent settings
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