VERDUGO RAMÍREZ, SERGIO IGNACIO
Preferred name
VERDUGO RAMÍREZ, SERGIO IGNACIO
Main Affiliation
Email
sverdugor@udd.cl
ORCID
0000-0002-9232-0786
Scopus Author ID
57217235600
33 results
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Item type:Publication, The dual aversion of Chile’s constitution-making process(2021); Marcela Prieto<jats:title>Abstract</jats:title> <jats:p>Chile initiated a constitution-making process in late 2019, after the major political parties signed an agreement to respond to the massive demonstrations that took over the streets in October of 2019. Dominant trends in Chile and Latin America’s constitutional thought typically examine this type of process through the lenses of the constituent power or transformative constitutionalism. The authors of this essay offer a different view. They argue that Chile’s constitution-making process, as designed by the multiparty agreement, manifests a double aversion: to avoid the Bolivarian way of constitution-making—including its associated constituent power narrative—and to put an end to the institutional and symbolic legacy of the Pinochet regime. In attempting to stay clear of these two negative models, the authors argue that the rules of the constitution-making process have adopted the main features of the post-sovereign model of constitution-making.</jats:p>14Scopus© Citations 27 - Some of the metrics are blocked by yourconsent settings
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Item type:Publication, Estabilidad, profesionalismo y politización en los nombramientos de directivos de agencias reguladoras independientes: lecciones desde la experiencia chilena(2020)3Scopus© Citations 3 - Some of the metrics are blocked by yourconsent settings
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Item type:Publication, The fall of the Constitution’s political insurance: How the Morales regime eliminated the insurance of the 2009 Bolivian Constitution<jats:title>Abstract</jats:title> <jats:p>Some scholars argue that constitutions may include an insurance that aims to protect the political rights of prospective electoral losers and prevents a dominant ruling coalition from undermining the competitiveness of the political system. Although some insurance scholars have recently paid more attention to the conditions that make an insurance more likely to be effective, the scholarship seeking to identify the limits of the insurance is still scarce. The literature on courts and democratization may help us to understand those limits by exploring successful and failed experiences. In this article, I argue that after constitution-makers agree to including an insurance, the incumbent regime may delay its implementation or, if the insurance is implemented, the regime may employ different political and legal strategies to eliminate it. I identify some of these strategies using examples from the Bolivian constitutional system. I argue that the Bolivian 2009 Constitution included an insurance and that the Evo Morales regime eliminated it with the help of the Constitutional Court. Although insurance theory expects constitutional courts to guarantee key institutional arrangements, the Bolivian experience shows that constitutional courts may in fact execute the opposite task, and that after constitution makers negotiate and approve an insurance, the challenge is to secure its implementation and survival.</jats:p>1Scopus© Citations 19