Why Theory of Mind Is Not Enough to Understand Others?
Journal
Behavioral Sciences
ISSN
2076-328X
Date Issued
2022
Author(s)
María Isabel Sanhueza
Type
Resource Types::text::journal::journal article
URL Institutional Repository
Abstract
<jats:p>Theory of Mind (ToM), understood as the ability to intuit one’s own mental states and those of others, has been extensively researched in developmental psychology and cognitive psychology. The psychological literature shows a direct relationship between ToM and the (self) reflective capacity of consciousness, a product of the cognitive effort that implies the understanding of one’s own subjectivity and that of others. In this sense, ToM has received a strong cognitive influence, sub-dimensioning other dimensions involved in the intersubjective process of mutual understanding. Based on the theory of pre-reflective consciousness and the theory of intuition in phenomenology, we propose in this paper that the process of understanding one’s own mental states and the mental states of others constitutes, mainly, a pre-reflective and intuitive experience, and that it is only possible to move on to reflection at a later time. In short, with contributions from the theory of pre-reflective consciousness and phenomenological intuition, the aim is to complement the theoretical bases of ToM in psychology; a theory that, without incorporating elements of phenomenology, remains incomplete.</jats:p>
Subjects
intuition
;
phenomenology
;
pre-reflective consciousness
;
reflective consciousness
;
theory of mind