Many governments formed ad hoc scientific advisory committees in the Covid-19 pandemic because they offered the government greater control over policy advice than standing agencies. The difference between ad hoc and standing advisory bodies has been little noted in the literature. High-uncertainty crises demanding expertise and requiring action from the national government increase the value of policy discretion, raising the value of controlling the scientific narrative. An ad hoc body is generally easier to control than a standing body because policymakers have greater liberty to choose its members, specify its mandate, and disband and reconstitute it when needed. Control generally requires either a narrow membership or a narrow mandate. If members cannot be chosen to be reliably aligned with the government or its policy preferences, a narrow mandate will restrain the committee from offering undesired advice or analysis. Our argument builds on the public choice assumption of motivational symmetry: The choices of scientists and politicians are shaped by the same motives and desires that influence individuals in any other sphere of life. Our case studies of Italy, UK, US, Poland, Uganda, and Sweden support our theory.

In the past few decades, constitution-making processes have shifted from being undertakings performed by elites and closed off from the public to ones incorporating democratic mechanisms. Little is known, however, about the determinants of voluntary public participation and how they affect the outcomes of the deliberative process in terms of content and quality. Here, we study the process of constituent involvement in the rewriting of Chile’s constitution in 2016. A total of 106, 412 citizens in 8, 113 different local encounters voluntarily congregated in groups of ten or more to collectively determine what social rights should be considered for inclusion in the new constitution, deliberating and then articulating in the written word why should be included. We brought our data to statistical regression models at the municipality level, the results show that the main determinants associated with increasing citizen participation are educational level, engagement in politics, support for the government, and Internet access. In contrast, population density and the share of Evangelical Christians in the general population decrease citizen participation. Then, we further analyze the written arguments for each collectively-selected constitutional rights. The findings suggest that groups from socioeconomically developed municipalities (with higher educational levels and where the main economic activities are more distant from natural resources), on average, deliberate consistently more about themes, concepts, and ideas compared to groups from less developed municipalities. These results provide an empirical ground on the driver factors of voluntary citizen participation and on the benefits and disadvantages of deliberative democracy. Hence, results can inform the organization of new deliberative processes.

Abstract This article contributes to the literature on complexity and macroeconomic models by exploring the analytical relationship and tensions between complex phenomena and macroeconomics. By evaluating the properties of organised complexity, this article suggests alternative strategies for analysing the macroeconomy. Drawing on F. A. Hayek’s notion of organised complexity, I examine how its causal properties relate to the analytical criteria and assumptions that contemporary macroeconomic models use. The purpose is twofold: first, I associate the properties of complexity to the idea of the macroeconomy as an emergent totality arising from the causal interplay between individuals and the organising structure. This conceptually challenges modern macro and frames analytical tensions between complexity and macroeconomic analysis. Second, introducing complexity facilitates breaking away from current analytical and conceptual straitjackets in macroeconomics. Economic inquiry requires looking for alternative ways beyond standard models to analyse the macroeconomy as an emergent totality. This suggests stepping away from current formalistic methods and radical reductionism, in favour of unconventional strategies and approaches that are sensitive to rules, structures, and the causal properties of organised complexity.

Abstract Social scientists are paying attention to the role that knowledge plays in economic phenomena. This focus on knowledge has led to exploring two challenges: first, its governance to reap positive externalities and solve social dilemmas, and second, how we can craft institutions to match the intangible nature of ideas with adequate property rules. This article contributes by elaborating on the different knowledge property regimes and the elements contributing to their classification. This paper first taxonomises knowledge governance regimes based on Ostrom’s work on institutional analysis. Second, it examines why governance structures for managing knowledge production vary across industries, according to (1) the characteristics of knowledge, (2) the attributes of the organisations, and (3) the different rules-in-use to enforce property rights. This is the first study at the intersection of institutional analysis and political economy that highlights the knowledge features, incentive structures, and mechanisms undergirding knowledge governance in different property regimes.

Aunque se inspira en Locke para formular su propia teoría de la propiedad, Nozick exige una y no tres condiciones (o estipulaciones) para la validez de las adquisiciones originarias. Esta diferencia invita a preguntarse si acaso la interpretación de Nozick de las estipulaciones de Locke es correcta o si, en cambio, el filósofo inglés no habrá multiplicado innecesariamente las estipulaciones. El presente trabajo examina ese problema por medio de la aplicación de las respectivas estipulaciones a diferentes situaciones hipotéticas. Sostendremos que la estipulación de Nozick es casi tan eficaz como las tres estipulaciones de Locke para preservar los derechos u oportunidades de terceros. No obstante, sostendremos también que la estipulación de Nozick es incapaz de hacer frente a ciertas dificultades que plantea la explotación de recursos naturales, dificultades que, sin embargo, sí pueden enfrentarse por medio de la estipulación de Locke de no desperdicio.